The Abuja Agreement reached between the government of the Sudan and the Sudan National Liberation Movement, Arkowi, was disappointing for the Sudanese people and for the people of Darfur, who made great sacrifices in order to attain a comprehensive agreement that meets their demands for a just division of wealth and power.

First: The agreement does not differ from the Nivasha one [the north-south peace agreement signed in January 2005] in its bilateral nature. It is similar to the latter in the intense pressure exerted by foreign elements, in order to impose the agreement. Thus it resembles the features of the bilateral agreement signed in Nivasha, in addition to the fact that its shortcomings and weaknesses are greater — a fact underlined by the refusal of the Justice and Equality movement and the SNLM, Abd el Wahid faction, to sign.

Second: Since the beginning of the Darfur crisis, all political forces in the Sudan have agreed to the holding of a national conference to reach an appropriate, realistic and radical solution to the problem. But the government refused the offer. Furthermore it circumvented proposals for an internal Darfurian dialogue prior to the national conference. The purpose of such dialogue was to hear the people of Darfur and be guided by their ideas at Abuja and elsewhere. But the dialogue did not conform to the required conditions set by the government, which objected to the participation of the political forces from Darfur, thus blocking a Sudanese solution to a Sudanese problem. This took place despite the fact that the government agreed at Abuja talks on Nov. 9, 2004, to present all would-be agreements at Abuja to the people of Darfur at a comprehensive national conference before concluding the agreement.

Third: The agreement deals with the government as if it were a neutral party in all the atrocities that have taken place in Darfur, while the government in fact is an integral party in the deepening of the crisis. Consequently the agreement did not deal with the question of holding to account officials and others responsible for crimes committed in Darfur.

The text of the agreement did not specify the mechanism through which the Janjaweed, will be disarmed, arrested and presented to a fair legal process.

Foreign “international” and regional powers who designed and brought to life the Nivasha agreement followed the same procedure in the solution to the Darfur crisis. This was done for a basic objective, which is the prolongation of the government’s term, because it is the only Sudanese government that can serve the interest of those powers not only in Darfur but throughout the region. Darfur, Chad, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Central African Republic and all states of Western Africa up to the Atlantic Ocean have become a field of competition and conflicts among the transnational corporations that seek to usurp, in the first place, African oil and other natural resources, using for this purpose such projects as the NEPAD [New Partnership for Africa’s Development] and similar development partnerships. The USA plays the dominant role in this regard.

Fourth: Talk about the position of Darfur and the demarcation of its boundaries, etc., does not conform to any objective reasons. Darfur has had the same boundaries since it was invaded by colonialist forces in 1916: one governorate of Darfur, with known historical and geographical boundaries. This state of affairs cannot change because the present government has divided it into three provinces, to realize its overriding desire to create disunity among the local tribes, African and Arab. The people of Darfur have been unanimous in their various conferences and even at Abuja and elsewhere in insisting that Darfur be one united province. They, the people of Darfur, can themselves choose how to determine its future.

Fifth: For all these reasons, we are of the opinion that what took place in Abuja is a deal that was brokered between the government and the “international community.” The people of Darfur as well as the entire Sudanese people are not a party to this deal. It is true that the government has shyly stated that it will agree to the entry of UN troops to Darfur only after the peace agreement is signed. But despite all the noise and empty threats which the government expressed about only allowing foreign troops in Darfur over its dead body, it has opened wide the Sudan borders to the entry of such troops, even though the agreement is still not complete, and even though peace has not materialized.

We would like to emphasize our keen desire that the question of Darfur be solved peacefully and democratically, in conformity with the wishes and aspirations of the people of Darfur, civilians and armed movements, and that the armed movements reach a program of minimum coordination of their demands, stances and actions to solve the crisis and attain the just demands of its people in division of power and wealth. We support their demand that they should have the post of one of the vice presidents of the republic and be represented in the executive and the legislative bodies, both on the federal and provincial levels, in proportion to their numbers and contribution to the national wealth.

For such an agreement to be a reality and implementable it should be presented to the people of Darfur before it is implemented, in an all-embracing conference for the people of Darfur. This will guarantee the minimum success of efforts to solve the crisis in Darfur. Otherwise the crisis will reproduce itself regardless of time.

Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Sudanese Communist Party, May 7, 2006